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By now, it is widely accepted by companies and civil society alike that the promise of technology to support human rights and human security has 
a dark inverse—it has become a powerful weapon for 
fomenting violence, conflict, and abuse. Social media 
has been used to further large-scale human rights 
abuses, armed conflict, and mass killings in places 
like Myanmar,1 India,2 Sri Lanka,3 and elsewhere.4 It is 
used to coordinate and direct5 hate-based violence in 
the United States6 and was used to promote a terrorist 
attack in New Zealand.7 Advances in AI technology are 
being exploited as tactics in asymmetric warfare,8 and 
facial recognition is being used to repress and surveil9 
on a mass scale.10 And contact tracing tools developed 
to stop the spread of COVID-19 are no exception—they 
pose significant risks to human security.11
Emerging research shows that these risks are much 
more acute in markets that have a history of conflict 
or mass human rights abuses. In those contexts, the 
scope and scale of potential harms are significant. 
This is true whether we are evaluating the impact of 
hate speech and misinformation or the use of facial 
recognition for mass surveillance. It is also true 
when we look at the potential negative impacts of 
COVID-19 tech tools.
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COVID-19 and contact tracing 
pose risks for human security
With the outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic, 
governments all over the world ordered people to 
stay at home and started to look for ways to stop 
the virus from spreading. One established method 
for stemming viral infections is contact tracing—
investigating all contacts made by a person who is 
infected by the virus. It is traditionally done manually, 
and can be time consuming. To scale up the ability 
to use contact tracing to track and fight COVID-19 
outbreaks, governments and private companies 
partnered to develop new technology tools.
Some of these, called contact tracing apps,12 use 
location tracking or proximity13 tracking14 to identify 
when a user has been near someone who has been 
diagnosed with COVID-19. Some15 of them16 even 
track users’ locations. This is used to understand 
where outbreaks start and how they spread, and can 
be used to quarantine those who have come into 
contact with infected people. Other governments are 
partnering with private companies to create websites 
for users to input health and personal data for 
COVID-19 screening, or to create data management 
systems17 to help with manual contact tracing efforts.
There are many examples where countries have 
implemented these tools without proper privacy 
protections and where they pose a risk for human 
security. China built a mandatory smartphone app to 
track the movements18 of huge numbers of people 
in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. It can impose 
restrictions on movement, and appears to send 
personal data to police. This is especially risky in a 
country that has used facial recognition surveillance 
to target ethnic minorities.19 In Guatemala,20 a contact 
tracing app collects data about users’ exact location, 
even when the app is closed. The data can be held 
for up to ten years, and the President has indicated 
that he hopes the app will evolve to cover “security 
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issues.” In Israel, the government has turned 
to cell phone location data to conduct 
contact tracing and order individualized 
quarantines21. NSO, an Israeli company 
infamous for the Pegasus spyware software 
that it develops, had developed a contact 
tracing tool that analyzes huge volumes 
of data to map people’s movements and 
contacts.22 Nearly a dozen countries are 
reportedly testing23 this tool. This is part 
of a wave of surveillance companies 
repurposing spy and law enforcement 
tools24 to track the coronavirus and enforce 
quarantines. In Ethiopia,25 the state released 
a COVID-19 monitoring platform26 where 
users can report others suspected of 
having symptoms—based on subjective 
assessments of their symptoms. This is 
particularly concerning in that context, 
given the reports of harassment and 
discrimination against foreigners27 and 
healthcare workers28. And there are many, 
many other problematic examples.29 
Of course, in the face of a global pandemic, 
there are legitimate tradeoffs that 
governments can make. Some privacy 
violations might be necessary, as long as 
they are proportionate and strictly limited 
to COVID-19 efforts. Moreover, there 
are positive applications of technology 
which can deliver effective responses to 
COVID-19, not only in mitigating the health 
consequences of the pandemic, but also 
in protecting livelihoods and generating 
alternative economic opportunities 
despite the virus. 
The effectiveness of these tools is still 
uncertain, especially for communities 
where smartphone penetration is low. 
Many of the tools fail to take into account 
systemic inequalities in how people access 
the internet. Technology use also discounts 
living conditions for many of the world’s 
most vulnerable populations, where users 
are not necessarily individually linked to 
a mobile phone. For example, migrant 
workers in the Persian Gulf often share a 
phone; refugees living in camps are known 
to switch between multiple SIM cards; and 
people often share one smartphone with 
other family members.
What is certain, however, is that in high-
vulnerability contexts, these COVID-19 
tech tools pose a number of serious 
risks to human security, yet also have the 
potential to enhance human security in 
the face of the threat of health, social and 
economic disruption.. 
The challenge, therefore, is to put in place 
guidance and methodologies that guard 
against mis- or unintended use of technology 
while also directing effectively its positive 
potential. A human security approach to 
technology seeks to broaden the horizon 
of potential harms by considering the 
comprehensive and interrelated nature 
of threats to people from the increased 
use of technology. At the same time, 
human security methodology is also 
about empowering people in spite of their 
vulnerability and apparent powerlessness. 
In this sense, a human security approach 
to tech responses to COVID-19 considers 
how tech companies, governments, and 
other actors can intervene to work with 
communities in ways that enhance their 
agency in the face of the pandemic. 
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Civil society responses 
to mitigate harm
The International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) warns30 that the 
“unsuitable design or usage of such apps 
could lead to stigmatization, increased 
vulnerability and fragility, discrimination, 
persecution, and attacks on the physical 
and psychological integrity of certain 
populations.” It calls for technology 
companies developing these apps to 
employ “data protection by design” and 
other responsible technology practices. 
The ICRC notes that misuse of contact 
tracing technology can impair trust in 
public health responses to the outbreak 
and further exacerbate outbreaks in 
those communities. 
Amnesty International31 also calls for 
companies and governments designing 
contact tracing apps to build in privacy 
and data protection by design, among 
other recommendations.32 This means 
that any data collected must be the 
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minimum amount necessary, must be securely 
stored, and must be collected strictly for the 
purpose of controlling the spread of COVID-19. 
Data should be anonymized, even when 
combined with other data sets. It should not be 
used for law enforcement, national security, or 
immigration purposes, nor should it be made 
available for commercial use. 
Human Rights Watch33 warns that using 
contact tracing apps will disproportionately 
impact already-vulnerable populations.34 There 
is the risk that governments will collect more 
data than is strictly necessary to track and treat 
COVID-19 outbreaks—and that it will continue 
after the pandemic is contained. Many lack 
transparency or legislative oversight and 
limitations. Many of the governments using 
technology to collect data about COVID-19 
have a history of pervasive surveillance 
and repression and discrimination against 
marginalized communities.
Privacy International directly warns that35 “we 
must build crisis-era tech with the presumption 
that it will be used in a country with weak rights 
protections, and that it will ultimately be used 
against the people it’s designed to protect.”
Interrelated and 
comprehensive impacts
While the privacy and human rights risks 
are significant, what is more concerning is 
the potential for these tech tools to cause 
or intensify violent conflict. Many of the 
governments using some of the most privacy-
violating versions of contact tracing and other 
COVID-19 tech tools have histories of conflict 
and mass human rights abuses. These tools 
can easily be weaponized to further repression, 
surveillance, discrimination, and violence in 
those areas. Where government intentions are 
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good, poorly designed and implemented 
COVID-19 tech tools can nonetheless 
undermine fragile trust in governments 
and public health authorities. It can impair 
legitimacy of state actors in situations where 
this can entrench perceptions of injustice 
and abuse—often root causes of conflict.
Many communities experienced an uptick 
in violence36 due to COVID-19 policy 
responses and flaring tensions exacerbated 
by increases in food insecurity, job losses, 
and other grievances. The pandemic, and 
responses to it, disproportionately impact37 
communities that have long-suffered from 
socio-economic hardships, human rights 
abuses, exclusion, and discrimination.
The COVID-19 contact tracing tech tools 
fits within a larger problem with the 
weaponization of technology and lack 
of regulation more generally. Much has 
been said about the potential impact of 
technology on human rights, in particular the 
right to privacy and freedom of expression. 
But we need to evolve that conversation and 
take a systemic look at how technology and 
human rights abuses contribute to violence 
and conflict in high-risk markets.
There are many ways that tech companies 
are inadvertently contributing to conflict 
dynamics through product design and 
release decisions. Sometimes technology 
products are used by third parties in order 
to foment conflict and abuse. Content 
moderation on social media platforms can 
also exacerbate a conflict. So can following 
government orders to shutdown internet 
services, or collect and process sensitive 
data. Sometimes just releasing a product 
or service in a conflict-affected market can 
have adverse impacts on the conflict.
Ineffective and lagging 
policy responses
In the wake of protests against racism and 
police brutality in Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Public Safety Commissioner John 
Harrington compared police investigations 
into arrested protesters to contact tracing 
for COVID-19. He was referring to standard 
police work—which does not involve using 
COVID-19 contact tracing38 or public 
health authorities.
It was a reckless choice of words that 
highlights an important example of how 
little the US public trusts law enforcement 
and potentially now, public health efforts to 
fight COVID-19. It also highlights a very real 
risk. There is no legislation in Minnesota 
that would prohibit law enforcement from 
using data collected by coronavirus contact 
tracers. In fact, other local governments in 
the United States have shared names and 
addresses39 of people who have tested 
positive for COVID-19 with police and 
first responders. 
This is an issue that the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation has raised extensively. 
“We need new laws to guarantee such 
data minimization, not just for contact 
tracing, but for all COVID-19 responses 
that gather personal information,” Adam 
Schwartz, senior staff attorney for the EFF, 
recently wrote.40
Technology’s role in facilitating human 
rights abuse and inciting violence has 
become an emerging concern of regulators 
and civil society. They have made calls for 
improvements to corporate regulation, both 
internal and external. But even as these 
risks are becoming apparent, there is little 
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public accountability for the actions of tech 
companies large or small. The relevant 
domestic and international regulatory 
landscapes are fragmented, reactionary, 
and ill-equipped to respond in effective and 
systematic ways. Legal responses have 
also led to new concerns about undue 
restrictions on freedom of expression, a lack 
of due process, and abuse of regulation to 
create further opportunities for human rights 
abuse or inciting conflict. In the absence 
of effective state or international law, it is 
important to turn to industry-led regulation 
and multi-stakeholder initiatives that 
promote accountability, but also safeguard 
and underpin the agency of tech users. 
Integrated and holistic 
responses 
Other industries have developed 
multi-stakeholder processes—involving 
partnerships between private industry, civil 
society, and governments—to establish 
accountability norms for human rights and 
conflict sensitivity. Examples include the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,41 
the Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights,42 and the Kimberley Process 
for the Certification of Diamonds.43
However, there is nothing similar for the 
technology industry tied specifically to 
human security and conflict. Conflict-
sensitivity and business and human rights 
guidance created for other industries are ill-
suited for the tech industry. Most business 
and human rights and conflict sensitivity 
initiatives fail to specifically address 
many issues unique to rapidly changing 
technologies and their impact on conflict 
and human security. Technology companies 
face unique challenges and typically have 
business structures that require bespoke, 
carefully crafted policies and practices. At 
present, we do not know how companies 
perceive, react to, and operationalize 
these norms at scale. Nor do we have a 
clear understanding of how those actions 
translate into preventing abuse and violence 
on the ground or how they can be leveraged 
to deliver human security in the sense of 
protection and empowerment of individuals. 
This gives rise to an urgent need to 
understand how these technologies—
including the near ubiquitous adoption of 
COVID-19 contact tracing apps—impact 
conflict, vulnerable communities, and what 
good regulation looks like. 
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With the outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic, 
governments and private companies partnered to 
develop contact tracing apps to stem the tide of 
infections. But there are serious human security 
risks when using contact tracing apps in highly 
vulnerable communities. There is an urgent need 
for guidance and methodologies that guard against 
mis- or unintended use of technology while also 
directing effectively its positive potential. In this 
strategic update, Jennifer Easterday explores how 
a human security approach to COVID-19 tech tools 
would prompt tech companies, governments, and 
other actors to work with communities in ways that 
enhance their agency in the face of the pandemic 
to both reduce the risk of exacerbating conflict 
while maximizing the benefits of technology.
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